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Are There Myths on Road Impact and Transport in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
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Abstract: As planned large investments in road infrastructure continue to be high on the agenda of many 
African countries, only few of these countries have actually amended their investments strategy. In many 
cases, there seems to be a preference for a status quo that can easily be explained by political economy 
factors driving the policies in the sector. This paper first presents data on the state of roads in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (length, density, condition) as well as on investments in the sector over the last decades. It then 
demonstrates how most countries’ strategies are based on some misperceptions and recommends some 
changes to improve the developmental impact of roads investments. Better prioritization of investments, 
better procurement and contract management, better projects implementation and better monitoring are 
still needed, in spite of the efforts observed in the last 10 years. 
Keywords: transport, roads, Sub-Saharan Africa, strategy, infrastructure, procurement. 
JEL Codes: H41, O18, O55, R42 
 
Résumé : Alors que les investissements routiers sont toujours en tête des agenda de la plupart des pays 
Africains, seuls certains d’entre eux ont modifié leur stratégie d’investissement. Il semble en effet existé 
une préférence pour le status quo, préférence due aux facteurs d’économie politique conduisant les 
décisions dans le secteur. Cet article présente tout d’abord l’état des routes en Afrique Sub-saharienne 
(longueur, densité, condition) et sur les investissements dans ce secteur sur les dernières décennies. Il 
démontre ensuite que la plupart des stratégies des pays concernés sont basées sont des perceptions 
erronées et recommande des changements pour améliorer les impacts développementaux des 
investissements routiers. Malgré les efforts observés sur les 10 dernières années, des améliorations restent 
à faire en termes de hiérarchisation des priorités, de gestion et d’acquisition des contrats, de mise en 
œuvre et de suivi des projets. 
Mots clés : Transport, routes, Afrique Sub-saharienne, stratégie, infrastructure. 
Codes JEL : H41, O18, O55, R42 
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1. Introduction 
 
The lack of an effective transport system is considered as one of the main impediments to 
economic development and poverty reduction. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), road transport is by far the 
dominant transportation mode, carrying over 75% of passengers and freight. But more than 50% of these 
roads are in poor condition, mainly due to underfinanced and poor management of road maintenance 
(Zietlow 2007). Intra-regional connectivity is said to be overall deficient. The focus on road investments 
in SSA has become increasingly important for enabling growth and poverty reduction. 
As yet, investment strategies have been mainly based on a too simplistic assumption that 
infrastructure would inevitably yield a large economic impact, whereas reality is much more complex
2
. 
For instance, access to roads and road condition along the main corridors in SSA are not as bad as 
expected. Also, some measures undertaken to tackle the cost of transport such as establishing one-stop 
border posts, commercialize road agencies or develop a rural access index seem not to have the predicted 
impact (even though rigorous evaluations still need to be carried out). Knowledge on the developmental 
impact of roads is improving and already calls for revising strategies. The objective is to enhance the 
impact of roads investments through better prioritizing investments and better monitoring procurement 
and projects implementation. 
This is a particular need while a recent scaling-up of roads infrastructure investments has been 
launched and is being implemented. Hence, at the time of current or planned large investments in road 
infrastructure, many countries have not yet amended their investments strategy.  
It is usually forgotten that a road infrastructure is only part of the investments needed for 
improved mobility and accessibility.  Transport services, typically provided by the private sector, are 
equally important. However, the public sector sometimes proceeds to invest in infrastructure only to 
realize the private sector does not follow through in providing transport services.  In order to maximize 
returns, it is important that investments in both are realized. 
The paper is organized as followed. The next section presents a literature review based on a 
narrative survey and a quantitative analysis. The third section gives a picture of the situation in the road 
sector in SSA in the last two decades (i.e. trends in infrastructure endowments, roads quality and costs, 
spending trends), It reviews the institutional development in the sector and presents roads investments 
policies. The third section summarizes the recent research findings related to roads investments in SSA 
                                                          
2 Three key factors matter for the developmental impact of roads investments: strategy (by assessing the economic 
impact, selecting a technical solution, assessing sustainability of the selected technical option), sector financing 
(assessing revenues related to network size and unit costs) and institutional support (the institutional structure and 
various incentives among donors/governments/local authorities). 
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and the fourth section calls for some possible adjustments of road investments strategies in SSA. The final 
section concludes and proposes some areas for further research. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The roads-poverty relation can be assessed 1) by focusing on the channels of the impact of roads 
on poverty or 2) by defining a poverty proxy as a function of road access. 
 
Several channels can be identified. First, roads facilitate the provision of basic needs to the poor 
such as health and education (Mu and van de Walle, 2007; Khandker et al, 2009). Roads are also a 
complementary input for these provisions of human capital formation facilities to be effective (Gannon 
and Liu, 1997).  
Second, roads ease access to markets. The greater availability of inputs and their reduced prices 
due to lower transport costs increase productivity as showed by Khandker et al (2010), Minten and Stifel 
(2008), or Gibson and Rozelle (2003) . In turn, production and income increase too (; Jacoby and Minten, 
2009; Wondemu and Weiss, 2010; Stifel et al, 2012). 
The last channel concerns employment. First, transport infrastructure can reduce poverty by 
creating employment and new job opportunities (Jacobs and Greaves, 2003). The construction and 
maintenance of a road are labor-intensive operations and can provide job opportunities to people living 
around. Ianchovichina et al (2012) show that "roads projects [have] a direct impact on creation of 
relatively low-skilled jobs". Second, the provision of roads also entails a greater and/or cheaper 
availability of labor markets. For example, Mu and van de Walle (2007) show that road projects in 
Vietnam increased employment opportunities by 11% for unskilled labor. Finally, the literature provides 
insights on the relation between road access and the two ways to define diversification of income sources: 
choice of the sector, and multiplication of activities. 
The choice of the sector refers to the choice between agriculture and non-agriculture activities. 
Smith et al (2001) show that road rehabilitation projects in Uganda extended job opportunities in the 
service sector. In Tanzania, this kind of project developed job opportunities for non-agricultural 
employment (Lanjouw et al, 2001). Gollin and Rogerson (2010) show that large subsistence agriculture 
sectors are promoted by a lack of transportation infrastructure in Uganda. 
The other way to think about diversification is as a multiplication of income sources. On the one 
hand, diversification occurs in remote areas as a way to deal with the local demand for multiple goods and 
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services (Barrett et al, 2001; Block and Webb, 2001). On the other hand, access to markets can help 
develop multi-activities since opportunities to diversify are greater (Gibson and Rozelle, 2003). 
However, due to data limitation, it can be hard to disentangle the three channels and researchers 
may prefer to define a global impact of roads access on poverty. Various works report that road 
connectivity has a positive and significant impact on poverty. Evidence notably include Jacoby (2000), 
Bigman et al (2000), Jalan and Ravallion (2002), Deininger and Okidi (2003), Mogues et al (2008), Nuru 
and Seebens (2008), Dercon et al (2009, 2011). 
The common limitation of all these works is that they generally cannot control for the typical 
endogeneity bias affecting the roads-poverty/development relation. Endogeneity can stem from a 
simultaneous determination issue coming from unobservable determinants. In fact, the decision to build a 
road is subject to various demands, such as geographical and topographic conditions that also determine 
economic condition. Simultaneous determination can also lead to biased estimates of roads impact 
because people do not randomly settle next to roads once they have been constructed. In particular, the 
localization choices of people are driven by specific individual characteristics that can also dictate their 
poverty status. In the same vein, a reverse causality issue may also be at work as the poverty status of a 
household can determine their localization choices alongside a road. 
Van de Walle (2009) recommends the use of appropriate estimation methods such as difference-
in-difference, Propensity Score Matching, and instrumentation.
3
 The General Method of Moments is also 
used to deal with unobservable characteristics as in Jalan and Ravallion (2002), Dercon et al (2009, 2011) 
and Khandker and Koolwal (2011). Finally, the use of a general equilibrium context can also help in 
dealing with the endogeneity issue between road management and investment decision.
4
 A more macro 
literature on transport and development (urbanization, trade) develops clever identification strategies 
based on new GIS dataset and historical perspectives:  Atack et al (2009), Jedwab and Moradi (2011), 
Banerjee et al (2012), Storeygard (2012). 
 
If this narrative survey seems to legitimate the massive roads investments implemented in SSA, 
Estache (2010) underlines that such studies make comparisons and generalizations difficult. However, 
Castaing Gachassin (2013) shows in her meta-analysis that the micro literature on the roads-poverty 
relation reports a true underlying empirical effect and that it is not due to a publication bias. 
Therefore, roads help decreasing poverty in developing regions but knowledge about the 
heterogeneity of roads impacts is still limited. The next step for the empirical literature is to document the 
                                                          
3
 See the papers of Khandker et al (2009, 2010) and Mu and van de Walle (2007) for examples of DD and matching, 
and Gibson and Rozelle (2003) for instrumentation. 
4
 See Fan et al (2000) on India, Fan et al (2002) and Fan and Chan-Kang (2004) on China, Fan et al (2004) on 
Thailand, Fan et al (2005) on Tanzania. 
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variety of effects and their conditioning to regional, local and individual characteristics to achieve 
efficiency in roads investments. 
 
3. Data on Road Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Road infrastructure endowments 
Figure 1 below depicts the actual situation of all world regions for the total road network density 
in relation to land area. SSA lags far behind, with density that represents less than a quarter of the world 
average. Defining road density in terms of population
5
, the situation marginally differs (see Figure 2). 
This density is slightly lower than the Middle East's and the North Africa; and slightly higher than South 
Asia. 
Figure 1: Spatial Density of Road Network 
 
Source: Gwilliam et al (2008) 
 
Figure 2: Total Road Network per capita 
                                                          
5
 This is more accurate as the first measure partly reflects the low population densities in the region. 
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Source: Gwilliam et al (2008) 
 
This general world description hides the heterogeneity experienced across African countries. On average 
in SSA road-to-population density is of about 3.7 kilometers per thousands of inhabitants; it ranges from 
0.37 for Sudan to 35.7 for Namibia (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: Roads Density per country in SSA (in kilometers per thousands of inhabitants) 
RANK COUNTRY DENSITY RANK COUNTRY DENSITY 
1   Namibia 35.67 24   Cape Verde 2.50 
2   South Africa 8.44 25   Cameroon 2.36 
3   Gabon 6.70 26   Sao Tome and 
Principe 
2.34 
4   Equatorial Guinea 6.57 27   Burundi 2.27 
5   Central African 
Republic 
6.41 28   Kenya 2.13 
6   Zambia 6.37 29   Gambia, The 2.12 
7   Botswana 5.89 30   Ghana 2.03 
8   Chad 4.20 31   Mozambique 1.73 
9   Congo, Rep. 3.84 32   Nigeria 1.69 
10   Angola 3.81 33   Comoros 1.66 
11   Guinea 3.69 34   Mauritius 1.63 
12   Liberia 3.64 35   Rwanda 1.60 
13   Lesotho 3.35 36   Togo 1.45 
14   Guinea-Bissau 3.31 37   Senegal 1.44 
15   Somalia 3.25 38   Mali 1.33 
16   Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.21 39   Eritrea 1.17 
17   Madagascar 3.17 40   Burkina Faso 1.14 
18   Cote d'Ivoire 3.08 41   Benin 0.97 
19   Mauritania 2.98 42   Niger 0.89 
20   Swaziland 2.90 43   Ethiopia 0.46 
21   Tanzania 2.59 44   Sudan 0.37 
22   Sierra Leone 2.59    
23   Malawi 2.53    
Source: World Development Indicators 
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These first figures and table only provide a snapshot that should not be used to infer policy 
recommendations. First, road density data are weak proxies to benchmark their economic impact since 
roads investments depend primarily on the size of a country and the location of settlements. Also, lengths 
and densities are actually not relevant objectives as expanding networks may not be necessary in the 
region. This also questions the fiscal sustainability of such projects which is hard to achieve in the region. 
Second, it does not inform on the issues of condition and quality which are at the core of the sector's 
challenges. Finally, the issues related to the governance of the road sector cannot be assessed with such 
data. 
 
Road infrastructure spending  
In SSA, spending on roads accounts on average for less than 2 percent of GDP, i.e. approximately 
$9,000 a kilometer for main road networks, compared to 1 percent in industrialized countries, or 2–3 
percent in fast-growing emerging economies (Gwilliam et al., 2008). Hence, there are important 
differences across the region: the spending ranges from less than 1 percent in South Africa to almost 4 
percent in Malawi (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Average annual expenditures on roads, by country, 2001-2005 (US$ per capita and % of GDP) 
 
Source: Gwilliam et al. (2008) 
 
According to the World Road Statistics from the International Road Federation (IRF), 
maintenance expenditures are generally lower than construction expenditures. For example, in 2008 
Burkina Faso spent about 68 million US$ on maintenance and 193 million US$ on construction, and 
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Tanzania about 124 million US$ on maintenance and 182 million US$ on construction. If some countries 
spend more on maintenance than construction (Ghana, Congo or Cameroon), on average capital 
expenditures actually represent two thirds of the total roads spending when needs should share equally 
between capital and maintenance operations (Gwilliam et al, 2008). 
Investing in SSA’s roads infrastructure is one of the priorities of donors6. Table 2 below presents 
the percentages of aid amounts disbursed by donors in the total spending of the country, computed for 
those countries for which expenditure data was available from the IRF. On average aid accounts for about 
20% in the total spending but it varies a lot across countries. 
 
Table2: Aid disbursements in total expenditures, by country 
 Total Expenditure(*) 
million US$ 
Total aid (**) 
million US$ 
Aid/Expenditure (%) 
Burkina Faso (2008) 260.96 23.9 9.15 
Cameroon (2007) 527.39 71.1 13.5 
Ethiopia (2003) 106.19 106.65 100 
Ghana (2003; 2004; 2005) 123.1; 198.9; 257.4 69.94; 95; 149.4 56.8; 47.8; 58 
Tanzania (2008) 356.94 112.42 31.5 
Zambia (2005) 264.3 53.91 20.4 
Source: World Road Statistics for expenditure data and OECD-DAC for aid data. 
Note: (*) includes maintenance and construction expenditures. (**) includes DAC, EU Institutions and IDA disbursements. 
 
 
As the figures presented above show, spending seems to be not an issue in the road sector. More 
than the issue of missing links, the problem of poor road maintenance mainly due to a capital bias seems 
to be at work here. Insufficient maintenance translates into substantial additional costs, as rehabilitation 
costs are several times higher than the cumulative costs of sound preventive maintenance. The issue is 
well-known since the end of the 1980s (Harral et Faiz, 1988), and was re-emphasized regularly for 
instance by the World Bank Development Report in 1994. According to the World Bank (2010) 
addressing under-maintenance in the road sector could save about $1.9 billion a year in rehabilitation. 
 
Road quality and costs 
Substantial variations across countries in the region also exist with regard to the quality of roads. 
According to Gwilliam et al. (2008) about half of the main network is in good condition, and an 
additional one-third is in fair condition. For rural networks only about a quarter is in good condition and a 
quarter in fair condition. Also, Carruthers et al. (2009) report that only 30% of the road network linked to 
                                                          
6
 Tables in the Annex 1,2 and 3 show aid disbursements over the period 2002-2009 from DAC members, EU 
Institutions and IDA. 
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regional connectivity is currently in good condition. Large variations across countries can be related to 
some extents to differences in GDP, or geographic and topographic conditions. But the quality of the 
institutional and financing framework of the road sector is the main determinant of these differences.
7
 
According to Alexeeva et al. (2008), the average cost of the road works are quite similar, except 
for Kenya where the rehabilitation and reconstruction cost is particularly high , 955,755 US$/km (see 
Table 3). The periodic maintenance works in Mozambique cost twice as high as in Zambia. 
 
Table 3: Average cost per km of a 2-lane road by type of work
8
 and type of road
9
 (2007US$/km) 
 Rehabilitation & construction Re-gravel Upgrade to paved 
Periodic 
maintenance 
Country Inter-urban Urban Inter-urban Inter-urban Rural Inter-urban 
Congo   68,094    
Congo (DRC) 228,872  65,750    
Ethiopia 388,207   322,373   
Ghana 261,052    114,566  
Kenya 955,755      
Mozambique 278,661     197,086 
Madagascar   54,602   104,992 
Malawi 420,838    56,874  
Nigeria 329,909 1,505,480     
Tanzania    348,209   
Uganda    420,220   
Zambia   25,005   87,946 
Source: Queiroz et al. (2008). 
 
Institutional development  
According to Bruschett (2005), about 45 billion US$ of road stock was wasted during the 1970s 
and 1980s as a consequence of inadequate maintenance, which could have been avoided if about only $12 
billion would have been spent on preventive maintenance. The common belief that emerged at that time 
was that Africa suffers from an under financing of maintenance expenditures, considered mainly as an 
institutional problem (OECD/ ECMT, 2007).  
The first generation of earmarked road funds in Africa appeared in the late 1980s
10
 as a solution. 
They were based on earmarking of fuel taxes as opposed to the previous financing mode through the 
general budget. However, the issue of inadequate maintenance remained and in the early 1990s 
                                                          
7
 See the next subsection on the institutional development of the African road sector. 
8
 Rehabilitation/reconstruction, upgrade to paved, re-gravel, and periodic maintenance. 
9
 Inter-urban, urban and rural access. 
10
 Even some such arrangements date back to the 1930s. 
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development partners and governments of SSA recognized the need to set up new reforms. This was given 
concrete expression through the Road Maintenance Initiative (RMI) for SSA countries. The RMI aimed at 
increasing road sector’s efficiency through establishing autonomous road agencies with an effective 
structure and clearly defined responsibilities, and creating Road Maintenance Funds financed by road 
users charges and managed by a Roads Board (with members from both public and private sectors). This 
also marked the emergence of the second generation of road funds based on seven design features: (1) a 
clear legal basis to protect against political interference
11
; (2) creation of road agencies for public works 
execution to allow the separation between funding and implementation
12
; (3) road user charges in form of 
fuel levies
13
; (4) funds directly transferred to the road fund to avoid the risk of diverting resources for 
financing other public expenditures revenues
14
; (5) users represented in the road fund board to ensure 
accountability
15
; (6) clear rules for the allocation of revenue to reduce discretion
16
; (7) independent 
auditing and public reporting of road fund activities to insure accountability
17
. 
 Despite these reforms and clear objectives, the progress has been slow; some inefficient practices 
still prevail, and a lot of funds are still used for rehabilitation work. 
 
What are the underlying strategies behind roads investments? 
Roads investments in Africa are based on two key hypothetical assumptions: 
1. Investments in roads always generate traffic and reduce poverty, 
2. Roads in good condition produce large economic benefits in any instance. 
 
The ineluctability underlying character of these assumptions biases the vision toward extremely large 
expected benefits leading to the idea that road network expansion would be largely compensated by the 
created benefits. Consequently, roads infrastructure costs are usually overlooked and there is hardly any 
analysis of the fiscal sustainability of the projects. 
 
In terms of preferences, governments tend to favor (without necessarily acknowledging it): 
                                                          
11
 60% of countries with a road fund have such legislation. 
12
 65% of road funds have autonomous roads agencies responsible for project implementation, but the level of 
autonomy varies from limited to full responsibility. 
13
 For 80% of the countries, they vary between $0.03 per liter in Lesotho to $0.16 per liter in Tanzania. 
14
 Only a little more than 50% of the countries with a road fund channel at least 75% of the fuel levies directly to the 
fund without passing through the budget. 
15
 Only half of roads funds boards are not dominated by a government representation; very few have a chairman 
from the private sector. 
16
 60% of the roads funds have defined explicit rules for allocating funds. 
17
 Around 80% of the countries with road funds have annual auditing procedures in place but their quality should be 
taken with caution. 
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1. Rehabilitation over maintenance: Gwilliam et al. (2008) highlights what they call a “donor 
paradox”: while many reports have demonstrated the importance of maintaining roads in good 
condition and road sector reforms have focused on maintenance in Sub-Saharan Africa, this 
sector is still dominated by rehabilitation, leaving maintenance as a secondary priority. It is 
even more problematic since most countries can hardly afford to maintain their current road 
network and worsen the situation by further spending on upgrading and rehabilitation 
2. Trunks over rural roads: Despite the fact that rural road network typically accounts for 
more than half of the transport network in developing countries, and, despite numerous 
political statements, investments in rural roads is marginal compared to trunk roads. This may 
be explained by the complexity of those investments and low returns in some cases.
18
 
Furthermore, the strategies behind roads investments can be characterized with (excessive) generalization 
by lack of/limited prioritization of investments, uniqueness of technical solutions, and a mismatch 
between the needs and the returns on investments due to an equally distributed budget for rural roads 
regardless the variations among regions. 
The current pattern of road investments excessively relies on assumptions (or beliefs) and is 
scarcely based on reality (i.e. data and facts). The following section synthesizes the most common 
assumptions on the African roads sector that could be qualified rather as “myths” as most often they do 
not hold. For each misperception, we present the common belief, the factual reality and open the 
discussion on possible policy recommendations. 
 
4. The Main Possible “Myths” 
 
What happens en route and at borders: transport delay and bribes 
The first common belief is that most transport delay happen en route and/or at the borders to the 
hinterland. Arvis et al. (2010) demonstrates that for land transport to landlocked countries in SSA over 
50% of total transport time from port to hinterland cities are spent in ports. So contrary to what is usually 
perceived, delays on roads and at borders are in most cases marginal compared to cargo dwell time in 
ports (see Table 4 for the evidence along selected corridors). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 As it will be demonstrated in the next section, the benefits of rural roads are often expected to be higher than they 
really are. 
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Table 4: Average transport time breakdown between ports and hinterland along selected corridors in 2008 
in days Port Trans Dry port Border Transp. Clear. TOTAL 
Douala-Ndj  24 4 8 3 39 
MSA-Kam  13 4 1 1 2 21 
DeS - Kam  17 5 2 1 2 27 
Source: Arvis et al. (2010). 
Note: Douala-Ndj=Douala-N’djaména, MSA-Kam=Mombsa-Kampala, DeS-Kam=Dar-es-Salaam-Kampala. Trans is land  
transport time, clearance= clearance time at destination. 
 
However, in Southern Africa, border-crossing time is of critical importance.
19
 The advocated 
solution is the adoption of a one-stop border post (OSBP). Conceptually, this model is based on the idea 
that by removing one control, border-crossing time would be halved. However, customs clearance is 
scarcely done for exports at the border. Moreover, large investments are scarcely needed. Curtis (2009) 
advocated for: (1) simplified and reduced clearance procedures and (2) an effective border management 
institution gathering major stakeholders from both sides of the border in order to reduce the number of 
controls and agencies involved. Simplifying import clearance procedures is critical because at most, 
export controls account for less than a third of total border crossing time and customs account usually for 
half of import time
20
. Therefore, even though export control time would be divided by half, one sixth of 
total time would be gained. Hence, if customs clearance time would be halved, one third of total time 
would be gained. 
 
A second belief is that bribes en route mainly explain high transport costs. Teravaninthorn 
and Raballand. (2008) demonstrated that the cost of fuel is actually the main source of variable costs (see 
Table 5). Rents and bribes to logistics providers are actually much higher than bribes en route but they are 
much less visible so that they are not given the same attention (Arvis et al. 2010). 
 
                                                          
19
 In 2008, it took 39 hours for a truck to transit northbound through Chirundu and 14 hours southbound (compared 
to 34 hours and 11 hours respectively for Beitbridge). The first OSBP was thus opened at Chirundu (between 
Zimbabwe and Zambia) in December 2009. So far it seems relatively premature to assess if this OSBP produced the 
expected results, especially in terms of simplified and reduced clearance procedures Still, one-stop border posts are 
presently mushrooming in SSA. 
20
 It is interesting to note that idle time for northbound transit is much higher than might be expected. It is on average 
10.9 hours per transit, the main reasons being: (i) not handling documents on arrival, (ii) not crossing the border 
when able to do so, (iii) waiting at the border after clearance and before departing for the destination or (iv) carrying 
out activities (own business or social) when supposed to be on duty. Southbound delays are much less (ZRA – 5.6 
hours, driver idle time – 4.4 hours), but still drivers do waste time (Curtis 2009). 
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Table 5: Variable costs breakdown in the four sub-regions (in percentage of total variable costs) 
Source: Teravaninthorn et al (2008) 
 
 
Road expansion 
The common misperception concerning road coverage is that it is insufficient, especially in rural 
areas where there is a need to expand the network so as to ensure connectivity of citizens in these areas at 
less than 2 kilometers from a road. In reality, this is a more complex issue. 
First, the 2 km buffer (which is the main target for donors in SSA to improve road accessibility of 
rural population) does not seem to be an economic threshold. Increased rural road density has a positive 
impact on incomes but not the 2 km buffer. Using original household data in three countries, Raballand et 
al. (2010) found out that being at more or less than 2 km is not a major determinant for poverty. 
Therefore, some minimal road access is needed to impact income generation economically but investing 
to have rural population at less than 2 km may be considered as overinvestment.
21
Actually, most rural 
households are located at less than 5 kilometres from a road (even though they are not necessarily all-
weather). Continent-wide, road access at less than 5 km does exist for a large part of the population: 
almost 60% of the population is situated at least at 5 km from a regional or national road when using GIS 
data (see Table 6).   
 
 
                                                          
21
 This finding is consistent with World Bank (2009.2). This research centered on Malawi finds out that the optimal 
transport time for higher agricultural growth is 2.2 hours. Assuming walking or bicycle at 4 kilometers per hour, the 
optimal transport distance for agricultural production from a road would then be over 8 kilometers (from an 
economic point of view). 
Corridor 
Route 
Gateway-Destination 
Fuel Tyres Maintenance Bribes 
West Africa 
Tema/Accra-Ouagadougou 74% 16% 4% 6% 
Tema/Accra-Bamako 80% 9% 5% 6% 
Central Africa 
Douala-N’Djaména 60% 17% 10% 13% 
Douala-Bangui 60% 19% 9% 12% 
Ngaounderé-N’Djaména 53% 11% 14% 22% 
Ngaoundéré-Moundou 38% 12% 23% 27% 
East Africa 
Mombasa-Kampala 79% 13% 6% 2% 
Kampala-Kigali 67% 31% 1% 1% 
Southern Africa 
Lusaka-Johannesburg 51% 48% 1% 0% 
Lusaka-Dar-es-Salaam 60% 38% 1% 1% 
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Table 6: Sub-Saharan Africa road coverage 
 
 
Population covered (in thousands) Percentage of population 
Percentage of 
covered population 
Buffer Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
2 km 103,063 30,106 133,169 59.5% 17.2% 38.2% 77.4% 22.6% 
5 km 144,074 56,721 200,796 83.1% 32.4% 57.6% 71.8% 28.2% 
10 km 160,836 90,004 250,840 92.8% 51.4% 72.0% 64.1% 35.9% 
Source: Raballand et al. (2010). 
 
Second, it is usually assumed that despite increased size of roads networks, they remain sustainable as 
their expected benefits should exceed their costs. However, many SSA countries already face the issue of 
unsustainable road networks and may also explain why maintenance is not ensured for parts of the 
network. As an example, the annual cost of maintaining the paved and unpaved networks is estimated at 
USD 106.5 million and USD 133.3 million respectively in 2011 prices in Zambia. Maintenance 
expenditure should be fully financed from the fuel levy and road user charges. However, despite recent 
increases, their combined value was still only equivalent to USD 112 million in 2010, which is barely 
sufficient to maintain the paved network and leaves over negligible funds for the unpaved network 
(Raballand et al. 2011.2). 
Third, road access does not necessarily mean accessing to transport. Raballand et al. (2011) draws 
lessons from an original randomized experiment in rural Malawi. They show that without subsidies, a 
road even in fair condition may continue to be used by non motorized means of transport. So, the presence 
of a road with a relevant level of quality is not the only solution to connectivity, the provision of transport 
services must be under scrutiny as well.
22
 This can partly explain why walking or cycling is so widespread 
on most rural roads in Sub-Saharan Africa and why a road in good condition will most probably not lead 
to provision of service at an affordable price for the local population.  
Finally, because of limited plot size that binds production volumes, most African farmers in rural 
areas have only a minimal transport requirement, generally too low to fully load a truck. Intermediate 
Means of Transport (IMTs) and the appropriate (not paved) road infrastructure should often be preferred 
over truck transport, as the volumes to be transported are generally limited and the distances are relatively 
short. For instance, Sieber (1999) demonstrated in Tanzania that adequate IMTs coupled with pathways 
could have, in some cases, more economic impact than rehabilitating secondary roads alone. The "last 
mile should not be a road for truck" (Raballand et al, 2010). 
                                                          
22
 Evidence also exists on the fact that roads do not automatically generate efficient transport services in the case of 
international corridors (Teravaninthorn et al, 2008). 
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Road Condition 
The misperception about insufficient road coverage and the related fiscal sustainability issue open 
the common belief that road condition in Africa is usually bad (especially on the major corridors), while 
improved road condition is believed to cut maintenance costs and user prices. 
In reality, road condition on major corridor is not as bad as expected (see Table 7). Road 
conditions are worse in Central Africa comparing to the other sub-regions, but they are in a relatively 
good condition. This can be explained by massive recurrent investments in SSA along these corridors. 
 
Table 7: Roads condition along the main international corridors in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Teravaninthorn et al. (2008). 
 
Moreover, the causal chain from improving road condition to an ineluctable poverty reduction and 
increase in trade (see Figure 4) is not that straightforward.  
 
Figure 4: The causal chain of road investments 
 
Source: authors’ representation. 
 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.49
16 
 
For each of the three links/arrows in the chain, several factors make the relation between road 
condition, Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC)
23
, transport prices and poverty reduction/growth in the African 
context complex. 
First, vehicle operating costs are more reduced if trucking fleet is new and when roads are in poor 
condition (compared to fair), which means that rehabilitating a corridor in fair condition will probably 
have less impact than rehabilitating a corridor in poor condition, a common practice however in some 
countries. 
Second, reduced transport prices depend mainly on the market structure of the industry. While 
transport costs are not necessarily higher in SSA than in many other parts of the world (see Table 8), 
transport prices are instead the highest in the world along international transport prices (see Table 9). It 
appears clearly that in SSA there is not an issue of costs but rather of profits, due in particular to profit 
markups and cartelization. 
Also, while the focus has been for decades on improving regional integration to decrease transport 
prices through the signing of regional agreements and regional roads investments, without integration of 
trucking services
24
, reduction of transport prices is not likely to be achieved. 
 
Table 8: Transport costs in several countries/regions of the world (2007) 
 
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008). 
                                                          
23
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, poor roads are perceived as being the main cause of high variable operating costs, since 
they increase fuel consumption, increase maintenance costs by damaging the vehicles, reducing the life of tires, 
reducing vehicle utilization because of lower speeds, and reducing the life of trucks. Results from Teravaninthorn 
and Raballand (2008) with HDM-4 (Highway Development Model) simulations show a mixed result: in two African 
sub-regions (West and Central), where traffic is low and the truck fleets are old, as long as international corridor 
routes are paved in a fair condition, road condition does not emerge as a major hindrance to transport efficiency. On 
the contrary, in Eastern Africa, on the main trade corridors, improving road condition would have a significant 
impact in reducing transport costs, even if the roads are in fair condition.  But these cases are limited to a few 
corridor routes.  
24
 See Raballand et al. (2008) for an overview of the various measures important for integration of trucking services. 
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Table 9: Transport prices in several countries/regions of the world (2007) 
 
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2008). 
 
Finally, the impact on growth and poverty reduction depends on the share of transport costs and 
the role of the transport constraint. If transport accounts for approximately 10% of input costs, reducing 
transport prices by 50% may not necessarily create a breakthrough in competitiveness of the products. It 
can be different if this ratio is close to 30% (which is more unlikely). Based on more systematic trucking 
surveys and data collection, especially along the main international corridors, recent research have 
demonstrated that infrastructure is only one factor in the production function of a transporter. Transport 
services prices largely depend on market structure/regulation and thickness of markets and therefore, in 
many cases in SSA, investments in infrastructure will not lead to reduced transport prices
25
. 
 
Governance 
The previous subsection underlines the governance issue in the transport market that is 
characterized by cartelization. Here we demonstrate that the entire African road sector suffers from 
institutional weaknesses in particular its political economy, despite statements and incentives to reform it. 
 
A related misperception concerns the idea that construction costs are the highest in SSA and will 
continue to be high because of low volumes and the geography of the continent. Construction costs are 
indeed high in SSA
26
, compared to work costs in other parts of the world. Even though low volumes, 
geography and distance to import construction play a role, governance in the construction sector seem to 
also explain the high level of construction costs. In Tanzania the impact is up to 60% (Messick, 2011); the 
                                                          
25
 Most developments below are explained in details in Teravanithorn and Raballand (2008). 
26
 Even though there is no systematic record and publication of such data. This assumption is rather based on 
anecdotal evidence. 
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Kenyan Roads Authority and the Kenyan Anticorruption Commission (Government of Kenya 2007) 
confirmed that “collusion was rife” in the sector. In 2010, the Office of the Auditor General in Zambia 
also documented widespread procurement and construction practices, which led to fraud and corruption 
and therefore inflate construction costs (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Results of audit of Zambian road projects 
 
As high construction costs mainly derive from collusion and corruption occurrence, a great 
attention should be on procurement processes and the use of red flags
27
 as well as during the execution of 
works. 
Recent recommendations to improve the sector governance include the need of an Agency to 
coordinate road investment decisions and divide between funding and works supervision to reduce 
corruption. This follows the path of the second generation of roads funds. Remember that if the first 
generation of earmark funds
28
 was designed to solve the under financing of maintenance, the second 
generation emerged with the additional aim to fight against collusion and corruption in the road sector 
(see Section 3). However, after some years of implementation of the reforms of the second generation, the 
results are far from what they were expected to be (Gwilliam and Kumar, 2003; Allen and Radev, 2006; 
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2009; Roll, 2011; Pinar, 2012). 
                                                          
27
 See Alexeeva et al. (2008) for proxies to identify collusion and corruption practices. 
28
 For references on the debate on whether there is need or not to earmark funds for the roads sector (and give 
autonomy to the institution in charge of managing earmarked funds), see McCleary (1989). 
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Being an issue of people or not, the managements of these agencies have found difficulties to 
work closely together, and this induced coordination costs for projects implementation. More importantly, 
boards do not seem to have been able to deter/fight political interference in projects selection or projects 
supervision (like pointed out in road audits in Zambia for instance). In a weak capacity environment, there 
may not be a large enough pool of talents to manage several different agencies. Finally, one of the most 
important shortcomings of this institutional setup seems to have been the increased lack of accountability 
of civil servants working in this sector. Due to its potential complexity, it is relatively easy for road fund 
staff or road development agency staff to blame the other agency or the Ministry of Works and Supply.  
 
5. What does it mean for the future? 
Change strategy to better prioritization 
Roads prioritization is usually done by default after having allocated funding to highly visible 
projects without taking into account their impact on maintenance and on the sustainability of the network. 
However, prioritization should depend on the remaining budget after the difference between the budget 
allocation and the maintenance needs. After having estimated the maintenance needs of the main road 
network and the sustainability of the current network, the possible allocation for rehabilitation should be 
computed (taking into account public investment management and construction costs trends). 
Based on that, a level of service for each economic class of roads needs to be defined (and 
requires various technological solutions). Due to the fact that some parts of the road network may 
probably not be rehabilitated, based on objective criteria (such as traffic volumes), different classes of 
roads should be defined. 
Moreover, taking into account the service factor it is crucial since the relationship between 
infrastructure and transport prices is unlikely to be automatic in most parts of SSA. 
With regard to rural roads, the current investment strategies are largely ineffective and do not 
consider agriculture potential. Therefore, it is important to redefine the rural access index, focus more on 
the missing middle and better coordinate interventions, and finally monitor allocation to road 
maintenance. Although social criteria are important for road planning and will continue to play a major 
role, economic criteria should be given more weight in order to make investments in road network more 
sustainable (see Box 1 for an example of how would look like a revised road planning strategy)
29
.  
                                                          
29
 In this regard, a ‘hub and spoke’ concept, as defined by Starkey (2007) with conventional trucks transporting on 
conventionally engineered all weather roads (to district/secondary towns), and IMTs feeding agricultural surpluses to 
collection points on basic access routes. 
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Box 1: How Could Look Like a Revised Road Planning Strategy Compared to the Current Situation?  
Today, road allocation in secondary/rural roads is usually a function of three factors: (i) regional network length, (ii) 
the most urgent needs, (iii) political goals (which partially explains why funding is usually spread out and the most 
vocal or best connected MPs get the highest allocation in their region). Because of that, there is no strategic road 
planning; departments in charge of rural roads act when an emergency occurs or when political pressure become 
excessive. A revised road planning strategy would be based on objective data about (i) regional potential and current 
agricultural value, (ii) geo-referenced road networks with information on road condition and on problematic spots. 
Investment needs would be recomputed at the regional/local level. Based on this, some major investments would be 
carried out in priority in the most economically dense regions (mainly on the secondary and tertiary network). Due to 
budget constraints, some parts of the network would not be maintained and network expansion would not be sought, 
except on exceptional basis. The last mile would be the mandate of the Ministry of Agriculture or of local authorities 
and would be designed for IMTs only. This is the approach, which was adopted in Finland with the definition of 
level of service targets and a classification of roads per order of priority, per climatic conditions and traffic levels ; 
some roads benefiting from virtually 0 allocation and some from massive investments due to their “economic and 
strategic” value (see Isotalo 1995 for more details, especially annex 5). 
 
Source: Raballand et al. (2010). 
 
 
 
With this end in view, a decision tree on planning decisions in the road sector can be drawn (see Figure 
5)
30
.  
                                                          
30
 There would be a need to research IMT options and costing of animal/animal cart/bicycle trailer/motorcycle trailer 
/single axle tractor/two axle tractor/locally assembled small trucks, as these may be low cost options in some areas. 
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Figure 5: A decision-tree on planning decisions in the road sector 
 
Source: Raballand et al. (2010). 
 
Finally, it is becoming increasingly important to support the use of country-specific trucking data 
in the economic analysis and design of road maintenance strategies. Country-specific trucking data are 
sparse in SSA. As a result, generic data with many theoretical assumptions are used in model simulations. 
Data from trucking surveys could greatly improve the quality of the analysis and lead to more realistic 
results. One example is the need to introduce in the models the actual purchase price of the trucks, since in 
West and Central Africa these are often bought second-hand, instead of using the price of new trucks. 
Using actual data would lead to different results, in particular reducing the possibility of overinvestment 
due to overestimation of investment benefits. If the investment analysis were done properly with realistic 
data, higher traffic levels might be needed to justify road improvements in some cases. 
Also, some research/experiment should be carried out to enable basic access, especially in rural 
areas. Indeed, narrow roads or strip roads with either a – earth standard, b – half width paved <1,5m>, c – 
full width paved <3.0m> are usually suitable for IMTs and would reduce construction costs (since there is 
an economic viability problem in most cases). For instance, a narrow concrete road is sufficient to allow 
two loaded motorcycles to pass safely
31
; single track routes with off-pavement passing on robust 
shoulders for empty vehicles is also another option. Technical options should be much more differentiated 
                                                          
31
 Basic access interventions are defined as the least-cost investments which provide a minimum level of all-season 
passability. In a majority of cases, this means single-lane, spot-improved earth or gravel roads. In situations where 
motorized basic access is not affordable, improvement of the existing path network and the construction of 
footbridges may be the only alternative. Therefore the basic access approach should only employ the most 
appropriate and cost-effective interventions. 
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than what happens now since in many cases, there is an overinvestment in some communities and 
underinvestment in others. 
 
Reduce unit costs by better monitoring procurement and supervision of works 
As emphasized previously, corruption and collusion with contractors has led to increased 
construction costs. Therefore, in order to improve value for money of road investment projects, it is high 
time to start to reduce corruption occurrence in road projects in SSA. This is obviously a difficult task. 
However, several instruments have been recently developed.  
The first actual instrument advocated to reduce corruption and collusion is to carry out of 
contract disclosure to the public. It is demonstrated that generating information through regular 
publication, audits or frequent review of unit costs is important for the public in order to flag some 
obvious irregularities related to work projects. This is increasingly strengthened in many SSA countries. 
For instance, the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COST)
32
 focuses on the importance of 
contract disclosure to the public to strengthen monitoring of road projects procurement. Kenny (2011) 
emphasizes that transparency and oversight are potentially powerful tools (and cheap) to reduce the 
development impact of corruption and advocates regular publication of contract and implementation 
details. This should (i) reduce legal costs of contracting; and (ii) help spread best practices and ease the 
process of learning lessons from failed approaches. However, due to legal reasons, it is difficult to provide 
the public with all the details regarding bidding prices. Besides, disclosure does not necessarily translate 
into better governance, unless a demand for accountability (Castalia, 2009.2). Non-state actors are also 
increasingly interested in “procurement watch” initiatives and strive to monitor more closely procurement 
processes in countries like Kenya or South Africa. 
A second proposition is to develop community monitoring as a sort of compulsory requirement 
to improve governance in road contracts implementation. Increasing transparency depends critically on 
the community capacity for oversight
33
, and the supply-side willingness to redress the problems. But 
community cannot be conceived as a substitute for formal, professional audit and inspection functions 
(Castalia, 2009.3). The reducing corruption impact of community monitoring has not yet been definitively 
quantified (Castalia, 2009.3). The evidence of the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia 
suggests that its success is very much contingent on contextual factors and a combination of other 
                                                          
32
 Http://www.constructiontransparency.org/. Four pilot countries were from SSA: Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zambia. 
33
 Although oversight can bring many benefits in terms of improving value for money and probity in the construction 
industry, it may have some limitations, such as adding costs (the overseer may become another bribe-demanding 
agent or may not have enough leeway to operate). 
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monitoring and audit activities (Olken 2007). These contextual factors may be determined early on in the 
project cycle, leaving little scope for a community oversight impact on corruption (Castalia, 2009.3). 
Finally, conducting post-evaluation of projects selected randomly should be encouraged as 
recommended in Estache et al. (2010). 
 
 
6. Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
This paper presents data on investments in road infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa over the last 
decades. It demonstrates how research findings in this area question most of the current countries’ 
strategies and recommends some changes to improve the developmental impact of roads investments. 
Better data collection and updated knowledge in transport in the recent years call for the need to adjust 
some of the assumptions (that should be qualified rather as “myths”) on which donor interventions have 
been based in SSA for years so that the waste of aid financing is the sector stops. 
Despite evidence, several countries do not seem ready to amend their investments strategy mainly 
due to the political economy of the sector in favor of status quo. As highlighted by Benitez et al. (2010) 
four main power- and money-seeking motivations may explain the inertia in this sector: (i) populism: a 
strong eagerness to be reelected, whatever it takes; (ii) patronage: efforts to maintain power by an elite, a 
form of “club leadership”; (iii) an overly strong industry-friendliness, for currying future positions in the 
industry, for example; and (iv) corruption: the quest for money—personal benefits that the politician 
wants to keep secret.  
To be comprehensive, donors’ incentive framework should probably be amended: there should be 
greater emphasis on projects impact instead of disbursement. In this regard, documenting 
failures/successes and demonstrate how current strategies may have a perverse effect is essential. 
In any case, suggesting changes is not without challenges since adjustments make more complex 
the design and implementation of projects. Yet, if changes are not implemented, in several years from 
now, there could be a backlash against infrastructure projects like it happened at the end of the 80’s.  
Finally, investigations should be developed in this area addressing several key questions for 
which answers are not straightforward, such as: 
- How technically is possible to maintain a core network in fair condition? 
- Is splitting responsibilities between various agencies (funding and implementation) useful? 
- Does an independent road agency insulate from political interference? 
- What should be the incentives to differentiate allocation per districts for roads/secondary 
network? 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.49
24 
 
Without trying to address these questions, investments in road projects could lead to the same 
questioning of projects in the 2010s as in the 1980s when the excepted development impact of road hardly 
materialize on the ground despite massive investments. 
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Annex 1:  DAC members disbursements for road transport (million US$) 
Recipient 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Angola 0.122 0.003 0.003 0.155 0.004 N/A N/A N/A 
Benin 11.956 18.452 13.647 11.248 9.455 20.535 22.179 32.254 
Botswana N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.054 0.127 0.180 
Burkina Faso 0.818 7.517 0.237 0.551 0.530 0.043 N/A 0.091 
Burundi 0.471 N/A N/A N/A 2.197 0.004 0.211 0.665 
Cameroon 15.606 14.300 8.332 1.718 0.969 9.523 13.826 2.439 
Cape Verde 0.026 0.002 2.071 36.217 20.140 14.793 31.982 33.459 
Central Africa Rep 9.825 1.826 1.782 2.243 2.860 0.436 0.181 0.185 
Chad 2.207 N/A 1.176 1.496 0.111 N/A N/A N/A 
Congo DRC 0.354 0.411 4.324 3.450 4.554 4.694 11.666 29.927 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.414 0.002 N/A N/A 0.020 N/A N/A 0.005 
Djibouti N/A 0.065 0.077 N/A 0.001 N/A N/A N/A 
Eritrea N/A 0.154 0.662 1.788 3.505 0.331 N/A N/A 
Ethiopia 28.125 28.867 24.199 16.065 23.943 39.361 18.382 24.375 
Gabon 14.033 10.991 15.672 4.764 7.639 4.585 4.264 7.719 
Ghana 22.251 32.940 45.760 68.655 56.572 40.122 46.435 56.868 
Guinea 0.037 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.116 0.017 0.475 0.062 
Guinea-Bissau 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.041 N/A N/A N/A 
Kenya 5.436 9.095 11.245 12.116 23.837 13.104 29.999 30.551 
Lesotho 1.873 2.179 2.050 1.084 0.390 N/A 0.010 N/A 
Madagascar 0.700 2.497 14.929 8.417 5.114 0.550 N/A 0.060 
Malawi 1.387 2.098 2.862 1.969 0.540 0.213 3.569 4.710 
Mali 5.682 0.386 0.286 1.155 2.759 5.934 0.151 0.438 
Mozambique 15.370 21.992 9.723 36.549 22.136 18.378 18.287 27.729 
Namibia 1.164 8.093 15.021 7.812 0.860 5.644 11.828 45.377 
Niger 0.043 0.002 N/A 0.015 0.026 N/A 0.018 N/A 
Rwanda N/A N/A 0.078 0.298 5.653 3.914 2.466 1.085 
Sao Tome & Principe 0.003 0.021 0.996 1.099 0.491 0.420 0.002 N/A 
Senegal 0.674 1.671 14.259 7.412 4.596 3.800 5.206 9.859 
Sierra Leone N/A 0.380 N/A N/A 0.018 N/A N/A 0.013 
South Africa N/A 0.200 N/A N/A N/A 0.067 /A 0.007 
Tanzania 11.823 28.740 7.466 6.457 13.603 34.195 47.518 57.710 
Togo N/A N/A 0.158 5.513 5.746 N/A 0.115 0.027 
Uganda 10.282 2.280 4.016 0.765 1.741 5.019 2.136 1.928 
Zambia 30.505 34.542 18.147 14.521 25.556 10.507 12.255 14.591 
Zimbabwe 3.256 0.066 0.015 N/A 0.025 0.004 0.007 N/A 
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Annex 2: EU Institutions disbursements for road transport (million US$) 
Recipient 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Angola 0.125 0.008 0.362 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Benin 19.429 42.599 41.221 14.664 2.769 17.356 52.997 25.203 
Burkina Faso 31.091 26.817 16.629 19.687 38.186 89.624 13.905 11.752 
Burundi 0.028 N/A N/A N/A N/A 11.130 24.978 32.667 
Cameroon 13.642 15.796 30.926 19.454 32.332 37.086 38.102 28.971 
Cape Verde N/A 1.669 3.650 2.498 5.853 6.659 13.256 0.303 
Central Africa Rep  0.074 0.099 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.435 
Chad 9.567 17.635 24.343 21.834 18.997 11.264 53.866 37.196 
Congo  2.001 0.998 0.651 0.298 6.808 28.941 25.899 17.139 
Djibouti N/A 1.200 5.013 2.314 0.262 3.518 2.188 6.355 
Eritrea 0.151 N/A N/A 0.024 0.100 N/A 0.956 2.748 
Ethiopia 21.348 24.594 19.539 47.230 102.261 94.774 151.088 45.510 
Gabon 2.501 2.351 3.118 5.410 2.241 1.522 1.458 1.858 
Ghana 0.909 9.825 8.443 29.999 21.246 23.449 33.502 24.177 
Guinea 11.784 14.454 7.086 3.039 5.000 6.556 27.258 24.085 
Guinea-Bissau 8.293 3.241 5.465 0.242 6.670 15.568 15.357 13.582 
Kenya N/A 17.672 31.156 39.058 35.441 23.124 10.890 0.863 
Lesotho 6.809 11.085 3.156 1.055 1.818 0.478 6.859 N/A 
Madagascar 3.132 25.428 61.147 75.215 77.183 89.578 51.342 7.595 
Malawi 14.545 24.795 14.520 11.498 3.241 7.726 27.269 12.956 
Mali 20.533 35.493 21.677 35.894 17.413 55.474 23.819 0.180 
Mauritania 11.694 8.965 5.716 7.113 9.271 39.378 32.790 16.799 
Mozambique 8.975 8.395 11.224 26.335 46.832 31.063 16.258 13.454 
Niger 9.944 14.497 10.336 2.890 4.325 43.861 58.227 16.708 
Rwanda 3.430 7.189 12.673 21.513 6.653 8.729 32.595 17.556 
Sao Tome & Principe 0.008 0.004 1.076 3.110 2.432 3.131 3.560 1.384 
Senegal 9.867 7.908 7.960 14.045 17.651 25.892 40.394 53.198 
Sierra Leone 1.690 2.589 7.427 16.623 11.978 7.663 11.736 25.391 
Tanzania 10.225 12.425 39.200 71.307 56.367 36.322 11.132 3.634 
Uganda 2.596 1.811 28.727 9.698 18.409 34.355 95.024 24.918 
Zambia 8.634 11.308 9.780 32.949 27.645 1.286 45.806 8.827 
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Annex 3: IDA disbursements for road transport (million US$) 
Recipient 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Benin 3.937 2.763 1.221 0.034 2.665 1.084 10.375 4.010 
Burkina Faso 0.523 6.664 3.437 6.226 10.898 12.376 10.006 22.479 
Burundi 1.913 2.622 5.219 4.856 11.592 11.101 5.631 4.454 
Cameroon 7.420 9.012 5.663 8.343 14.677 8.036 19.173 19.993 
Cape Verde 0.433 0.451 1.418 1.644 2.147 3.868 4.623 0.945 
Central Africa 
Rep N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.215 1.361 6.217 
Chad N/A N/A N/A 0.744 0.509 0.581 1.214 3.500 
Congo DRC 5.404 7.925 2.497 0.451 0.429 9.556 17.472 14.419 
Congo  N/A 1.679 6.841 3.991 1.834 0.305 1.107 0.876 
Cote d'Ivoire 18.345 8.115 9.992 -0.234 N/A N/A 5.543 8.176 
Djibouti 3.599 9.122 2.632 0.735 1.086 0.548 1.048 0.094 
Eritrea 4.219 3.892 1.455 0.181 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Ethiopia 84.580 53.186 73.914 54.030 54.388 52.920 96.910 129.947 
Ghana 16.216 27.174 40.796 50.733 46.686 37.877 13.022 2.598 
Guinea 2.349 3.791 3.192 2.191 3.512 2.241 4.849 N/A 
Guinea-Bissau N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.219 0.689 0.674 
Kenya 4.918 0.890 5.533 0.350 -0.094 21.281 33.284 29.160 
Lesotho 4.685 3.416 1.293 N/A N/A 1.535 3.986 5.712 
Madagascar 2.825 8.884 32.683 17.338 43.227 41.662 26.698 6.746 
Malawi 3.717 0.700 3.322 9.189 4.234 1.673 1.333 1.612 
Mali 2.319 1.264 0.469 12.503 13.023 9.301 11.688 21.451 
Mauritania 1.589 1.610 3.123 3.332 3.975 4.312 3.547 1.126 
Mozambique 13.280 17.900 34.200 49.031 50.240 28.945 19.615 19.138 
Niger 5.036 5.111 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.097 6.718 
Nigeria 0.444 2.526 6.076 13.534 10.584 10.835 8.536 17.704 
Rwanda 6.125 N/A N/A N/A 1.043 1.512 3.657 0.655 
Senegal 2.076 4.836 15.729 25.776 22.099 19.838 10.772 9.278 
Sierra Leone 2.534 1.166 1.568 1.263 2.678 1.947 5.949 4.673 
Tanzania 11.388 17.073 18.985 6.604 14.676 51.168 53.767 25.270 
Togo 6.759 -0.007 0.000 N/A N/A N/A -0.237 0.541 
Uganda 15.379 19.999 27.561 25.724 40.621 49.880 59.663 51.139 
Zambia 6.932 6.696 20.573 6.442 16.803 10.881 16.999 8.285 
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